Recognition, or the lack of it, is a central concern in International Relations (IR). However, how states cope with international misrecognition has so far not been thoroughly explored in IR scholarship. To address this, the article presents a theoretical framework for understanding international misrecognition by drawing on discursive and psychoanalytical theories of collective identity formation and humour studies. The article conceptualises international misrecognition as a gap between the dominant narrative of a national Self and the way this national Self is reflected in the 'mirror' of the international Other. We argue that humour offers an important way of coping with misrecognition by ridiculing and thereby downplaying international criticism. The significance for international relations is illustrated through an analysis of the public diplomacy campaign, 'Presenting Israel', which, through parodying video clips, mobilised ordinary Israeli citizens to engage in peer-to-peer public diplomacy to explain Israel when traveling abroad. Public diplomacy campaigns are commonly seen by scholars and practitioners as attempts to improve the nation's image and smoothen or normalise international Self/Other relations. However, after analysing the discursive and visual components of the campaign -which parodied how European media portrayed Israel as primitive, violent and exotic -this article observes that in the context of international misrecognition, such coping attempts can actually contribute to further international estrangement.
Introduction

'This is the camel. The camel is the typical Israeli animal used by the Israelis to travel from place to place in the desert where they live. It is the means of transport for water, merchandise and ammunition. It is even used by the Israeli cavalry
.
With these words, a British TV reporter, dressed in khaki, depicts Israel, as he is walking past a caravan of camels in a desert. However, the reporter is not starring in an actual documentary film, but in a satirical video clip. One that was produced in 2010 by the newly established Israeli Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs (MPDDA). As part of the campaign 'Presenting Israel', the objective of the video was to mobilise ordinary Israeli citizens travelling abroad to become citizen diplomats. An accompanying campaign website coached citizens how to counter foreign myths and portray Israel as a modern, sophisticated and peace-loving state. The campaign was part of a series of initiatives meant to improve Israel's global image, which according to many indications had hit rock bottom.
1 Israeli officials promoting the campaign argued that despite the humorous tone, 'Presenting Israel' was responding to an actual threat to Israel's image, as foreigners 'paint a picture so different from the reality in the eyes of Israelis, and with such little regard for their point of view' (Seaman, 2010) .
The campaign was widely contested within Israel and abroad. Israeli media and academics criticised the campaign for being 'ridiculous' and for neglecting the link between international criticism and Israel's ongoing policies, such as the military occupation of the West Bank and the 'separation wall' (Bronner, 2010; Caspi, 2010; Haaretz, 2010) . Foreign reporters were also offended for being portrayed as 'stupid' and 'gullible' (Rabinovsky, 2010) . Nonetheless, according to the MPDDA, the campaign was a great success, seen by 86 per cent of Israeli survey respondents as an 'effective call to action' (Attias, 2012: 477) .
Between 2010-2012, over three million users visited the campaign website, hundreds of advocacy coaching sessions were provided to delegations, and over 100,000 advocacy pocket guides were distributed at the national airport (Attias, 2012: 478-9) . The conception of a growing gap between the image that many Israelis have of their country and the way the world sees it has become increasingly central to Israel's foreign policy, and in recent years, it has ignited a plethora of public-private advocacy partnerships, attempting to mediate Israel's growing sense of international estrangement.
To understand the campaign -and more broadly how states struggle for international recognition -this article explores the phenomenon of misrecognition in international relations. To do so, we need to go beyond the binary distinction between recognition and non-recognition that is so prominent in IR theory. Drawing on insights from poststructuralist discourse analysis and concepts from psychoanalytic social theory, we argue that articulating a discourse of a coherent national Self requires recognition in the 'mirror' of international
Others. This always entails the possibility of misrecognition, arising from the gap between domestic discourses of the national Self and the way in which Others understand and represent this Self. As identities are inherently unstable and incomplete, the reflection in the 'international mirror' will always disappoint. Misrecognition is thus inherent in any process of identification. However, once a specific sense of misrecognition is articulated into a collective discourse -for instance through international condemnation and criticism -it opens up new terrains for international politics.
Humour, we argue, plays a key role in handling misrecognition. Psychoanalytical theorists, perhaps most prominently Sigmund Freud, argued that joking not only helps release tensions; it can also create a sense of superiority. Developing this insight for the study of international relations, we argue in the second part of the article that humour is not merely a distraction from the serious problems of foreign policy and security; humour is an important social mechanism through which states discursively process and negotiate sensitive issues in international relations. State leaders joke about difficult conflicts and ambiguous problems.
For example, when Denmark faced global criticism over the publication of the Muhammed Cartoons (Hansen, 2011) , hostile reactions from Muslim voices were portrayed as aberrant to democracy and it was suggested that 'Muslims should get a sense of humour' (Rolfe, 2009: 262) . While rarely taken seriously in IR theory, humour is intrinsic to the very conduct of international relations. And as this article will illustrate, humour can, when used in public diplomacy campaigns, be a powerful tool to handle international misrecognition and consolidate a discourse of common identification against international and domestic Others.
The article is divided into four parts. In the first part, we suggest that misrecognition, as a discourse, is central to international identity politics. In the second part, we argue that public diplomacy represents attempts to reconfirm and stabilise a fragile and contested national identity, and we draw on theories of humour to show how states use humour to handle misrecognition. We then turn to the case of Israel in part three, providing a brief analysis of the dominant national identity markers in Israel and the way in which global criticism has helped create a discourse of international misrecognition, which has come to play an increasingly central role in Israeli foreign policy and public diplomacy. In the fourth and final part of the article, we apply our theoretical arguments in an analysis of the public diplomacy campaign 'Presenting Israel', demonstrating how humour, visuals and discourse interact to reiterate dominant identity markers and marginalise alternative visions of Israel.
We conclude that rather than improving Israel's image abroad, such public diplomacy attempts to mediate international misrecognition are likely to deepen Israel's international estrangement. The article shows how a focus on misrecognition and humour provides key insights into how international relations work and how national identities are maintained and resisted.
Recognition, misrecognition and national identity politics
International recognition, or the lack of it, is central to IR theory. As its most fundamental political unit -the sovereign state -is a relational entity, it can only exist if recognised by other sovereign states (e.g. Anghie, 2007; Ringmar, 2014) . With the emergence of the European territorial state and the so-called Westphalian system, membership of the international society and its laws required formal recognition of sovereignty by other sovereign states (Biersteker and Weber, 1996; Krasner, 1995) . Further developed in the context of colonialism through the reciprocal recognition of the European states and the denial of recognition from the non-European Others (Anghie, 2007) , '[i]t was through practices of recognition, affirming sameness, and through practices of nonrecognition, affirming difference, that international society came to constitute itself as such' (Ringmar, 2014: 447) . From this perspective, recognition becomes an either/or question:
Either the state is recognised as a sovereign state or it is not. Yet, this conceptual dichotomy between recognition and non-recognition is challenged the moment we move from formal recognition of sovereignty in international law to identity and moral politics, as the recent surge of interest in recognition within IR theory testifies (e.g. Agné et al., 2013; Burns and Thompson, 2013; Daase et al., 2015; Greenhill, 2008; Gustafsson, 2016; Lindemann and Ringmar, 2014 understand us' (Shamir quoted in Del Sarto, 2006: 106) . For Shamir, the problem was not a lack of formal recognition or non-recognition, but misrecognition.
Within IR theory, it has been suggested to distinguish between thin and thick concepts of recognition: Thin recognition refers to the legal status of a sovereign state while thick recognition refers to the recognition of specific identity narratives of an individual, group or indeed state (Strömbom, 2014) . Thick recognition has largely been addressed through social identity theory, which stresses people's ontological needs -that humans need a particular
Other's confirmation of their identity 'lest they feel insecure about who they really are' (Wolf, 2011) . Or put more radically, 'unless we are recognised, we have no social identity' (Ringmar, 2014: 8) . Applying this position to international relations, states are perceived metaphorically as people that need their national identity confirmed by other states. If this confirmation is denied, this is seen to be 'traumatic' (Ringmar, 2014: 7 ; see also Mitzen, 2006; Ringmar, 2002) . As Ned Lebow (2008) puts it, drawing on Hegel, there is a need of 'Others' for recognition and inclusion. In this sense, misrecognition is 'the feeling of […] the negative difference between a claimed self-image and the image given to us by others' (Lindemann, 2014: 543) . Accordingly, a state's actions are driven by attempts to close this gap and stabilise the Self in order to gain ontological security (Mitzen, 2006) , and this is ultimately what Ringmar (2014) calls international recognition games.
In a similar vein, yet drawing more on political theories of justice, fairness and entitlement, others see misrecognition not as much as an ontological concern but rather as 'a failure to recognise the status of the Other as a "moral equal of a person"' (Pilapil, quoted in Martineau et al., 2012: 4) . For Wolf (2011) , for example, recognition is not really a question of identity confirmation, as states do sometimes know who they are. Instead, it is when they feel unfairly treated -or misrecognised -that they insist on getting the treatment they feel entitled to. States may even start conflicts in order to get the recognition they feel they deserve. However, more peaceful ways of handling misrecognition are also possible.
Drawing on Aristotle and Heidegger, Berenskoetter (2007) contends that the friend as the 'significant Other' is capable, even at the international level, of reducing anxiety and pave the way for recognition.
Despite differences, these accounts conceptualise states as having 'feelings' and 'needs'. Yet, the problem is not just anthropomorphism -i.e. that 'states are people too' (Wendt, 2004 ; see also Epstein, 2011: 344) , and the downplaying of the gap between dynamics at the individual and collective level, but the essentialist assumption that the national Self as such can become more or less stable -that the gap between a state's selfperception and how it is seen internationally can be bridged (Bartelson, 2013: 112) .
In the next section, we propose a different take on recognition that draws on a poststructuralist understanding of national identity and a psychoanalytical conceptualisation of misrecognition. We argue, unlike the predominant recognition theories in IR, that the ability to close the gap between the national Self and the image reflected by the international
Other is impossible. Instead, what becomes politically salient is the process through which a multitude of diverse and ambiguous individual experiences are articulated into a public discourse of misrecognition through textual and visual representations. We will thus not focus on how Israel -or its leaders or citizens -really feel, but on how international misrecognition as a discursive construct affects Israeli public diplomacy and foreign policy.
National identity, misrecognition, and the international Other
To understand how identity becomes internationally misrecognised requires first a clarification of national identity. In poststructuralist IR theory, national identity is a public discourse that arises around predominant identity markers of a collective Self, and as all discursive formations, it is characterised by instability and fragility. From this perspective, foreign policy and public diplomacy as a sub-phenomenon of foreign policy are interwoven with the constitution and performance of national identities (Campbell, 1993; Neumann, 1998; Waever, 2002; Hansen, 2006) . This is because 'foreign policies rely upon representations of identity, but it is also through the formulation of foreign policy that identities are produced and reproduced' (Hansen, 2006: 1) . By differentiating between juxtaposed representations (Waever, 2002: 24) , 'foreign policy discourse always articulates a
Self and a series of Others', since 'identity is always given through reference to something it is not' (Hansen, 2006: 6) . Here, Self/Other relations are placed at the core of foreign policy analysis (Campbell, 1993) , since international relations as such basically represent the relations between estranged groups of Self and Others (Der Derian, 1987; Neumann, 1998) .
From this perspective, the ethical task is to find ways to maintain identity without Otheringor at least by creating less radical degrees of Otherness (e.g. Campbell, 1993) .
We believe that psychoanalytical social theory provides a key to understanding the specificity of misrecognition in foreign policy discourses. Indeed, psychoanalytical social theory is often associated with various forms of poststructuralism. Ontologically both focus on the role of language in the discursive construction of identity. However, Lacan's major contribution to poststructuralism is through his introduction of the Freudian unconscious, i.e.
as the element of subjectivity that has not and often cannot be articulated into language, and thus is resistant to discursive ordering (see Edkins, 1999) . This un-signified residue, however, has political significance, since it serves as the source of the human desire for identification.
In this way, it can contribute to the exploration of identity politics (see Jones and Spicer, 2005; Mouffe 2009 ) and particularly to the understanding of misrecognition.
As Lacan suggests in his mirror stage thesis, misrecognition (méconnaissance) is central to identity formation. Lacan argues that humans are born lacking the ability to communicate and thus differentiate themselves from the world. Mimicry therefore plays a central role in the development of a child. As the infant begins to recognise her or his own reflection in the mirror and identify with it, in this process, by differentiating him-or herself from the world, the infant develops a conscious sense of Self, i.e. ego. However, this identification with the mirror image also fragments and traumatically alienates the child from a previous sense of unity. For Lacan, the mirror stage becomes a general paradigm for identity dynamics, where recognition of the Self in the mirror of the Other always entails a sense of misrecognition from a previous sense of 'wholeness' and unity (Edkins, 1999; Lacan, 1985) . A move to a Lacan-inspired understanding of identity thus fundamentally 'undermines the cohesiveness presumed in the psychological study of the 'self' (Epstein, 2011: 328) , because the search for the unity of the Self can never be complete. Instead, in order to make social relations bearable, our everyday experience is structured by the invention of imaginary relations of identification, which seek to stich up the gap between the split Self and its image. Destabilising these imaginary relations is one of the core tasks of psychoanalysis, and it requires confronting the subject with the repressed gap (Žižek, 2008) . In applying these insights to international relations it is important to clarify the link between the individual and the collective levels of analysis. While Lacan developed his theory to discuss identity formation at the individual level, social theorists such as Žižek (2008) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985) began discussing its broader societal implications, arguing that discourse analysis should be complemented by an attempt to articulate and analyse that which is unsaid or repressed, yet nonetheless directs human behaviour. More recently, attempts have been made to introduce the Lacanian theory into IR theory (e.g. Edkins, 1999; Epstein, 2011 Epstein, , 2013 Zevnik 2009 ) to stress, as Epstein puts it, that 'the fundamental alienation is precisely the lack that lies at the heart of identity […] what defeats the possibility of a closed, cohesive self' (Epstein, 2011: 336 ). Yet, because states are not people and 'have no biological mechanisms' (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2014: 492) , representations are 'a key link' between individual experiences and collective political dynamics (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2014: 505) . Assembled into a discourse, representations serve as a mirror -or 'big Other' -through which collectives seeks meaning and purpose.
Thus, by analysing representations, be they textual or visual, we can examine how specific images of national Self are constructed and mobilised, drawing on a multitude of actual or potential individual experiences, thus creating new conditions of possibility for politics.
Applying these insights in IR helps us conceptualise how discourses of national Self relate to the perceived image of the state by other states, and, in this way, how the international serves as 'the big Other' vis-à-vis the state. Today, for example, international governance rankings, economic indicators and nation brand indexes (see Löwenheim, 2008) , play a key role in this regard, by presenting the state with 'mirror' images through which the national Self is reflected. These images can then be mobilised politically to promote a privileged image of the national Self. Israeli leaders, for example, use R&D indicators as a sign of recognition of an Israeli 'Start-up Nation' narrative, inspired by a bestseller with the same name (Senor and Singer, 2011) . 4 The international Other, however, can also destabilise discourses of national Self. Whereas stigma management concerns the management of deviance in international relations (Adler-Nissen, 2014 , see also Zarakol, 2010) , misrecognition refers to how states cope with sense of a gap between a claimed national Self and its representation by the international Other. For instance, when international sanctions or shaming articulate an image of the nation that does not resonate with the predominant domestic identity markers, they may engender a multitude of individual instantiations of misrecognition. Yet, to be politically salient, these individual instantiations have to be translated and publically articulated into a collective discourse of misrecognition, expressing explicitly a gap between the discourse of national Self and the international image.
In response to such -discursively constituted -gap or crisis of representation, various management techniques can be used to address and mediate international misrecognition, thereby (re)creating imaginary relations of unity with the international Other. One of the increasingly common 'gap-stitching' techniques in international politics is public diplomacy.
Managing international misrecognition
Public diplomacy as national identity management
In a poststructuralist reading, diplomacy is the practice of mediation between estranged political communities or groups of Self and Others (Der Derian, 1987) . On the face of it, public diplomacy is engaged in reducing the degree of Otherness. Understood as 'direct communication with foreign publics, with the aim of affecting their thinking, and ultimately, that of their government' (Malone, 1985: 199) , public diplomacy can be seen as a deradicalising form of foreign policy discourse. Unlike security discourses, where radical differentiations present the Other as a threat to the privileged self, public diplomacy discourses seem to aspire to inscribe less radical degrees of Otherness, with a view to winning the hearts and minds of foreign populations (Fitzpatrick, 2009: 1) . Indeed, this projection of national identity through public diplomacy appears -to its proponents at least -to be an effective way to communicate national interests; one that lacks the 'chauvinistic' and 'antagonistic' elements of more reactionary forms of nationalism (Van Ham, 2001 ).
More specifically, public diplomacy draws on mundane similarities, where the national and the international are not in opposition, but work in concert. Arguably, the purpose of public diplomacy is to 'maintain smooth international relationships' (Melissen, 2005 : 21, for a discussion of digital diplomacy, see Bjola and Holmes eds. 2015). While accepting that identities are fragile and unstable, nation-branding professionals and public diplomacy consultants promise to help correct foreign misunderstandings and prejudices by constructing and projecting a distinct and positive national identity, consciously highlighting certain meanings and myths while ignoring others (Anholt, 2002; Aroncsyk, 2013; Hocking, 2005; Melissen, 2005) . The underlying assumption in much of public diplomacy theory and practice is that such campaigns work by showing the best version of the national Self. Public diplomacy -and its promise of closing the gap between how the world sees the state and the state's own representation of itself -can be understood as a strategy. One that articulates a fantasy of unity between the estranged Self and the world by presenting a positive Self without a concrete devalued Other. However, there is little evidence to suggest that this has ever succeeded. In fact, such public diplomacy may even further radicalise foreign publics against the state (Khatib et al 2012) .
Moreover, public diplomacy does not just market a particular version of the national image abroad but also engages in a difficult and contentious domestic struggle to stabilise a particular version of national identity. In this process, according to critics such as Browning, new public diplomacy and nation branding, tend to turn national identity into 'decontextualised, depoliticised and dehistoricised montages' (Browning, 2013: 12) . As
Graan observes, the assumption that countries must be marketable to international consumer publics 'authorises a space of state governance concerned with regulating public space, public behaviour, and representational discourse on the nation' (Graan, 2013: 165) . Public diplomacy thus creates subjects in order to justify or develop policies. For instance, China's nation-branding exercises 'are part and parcel of Beijing's nation building exercises to instil loyalty to the Party brand and strengthen Beijing's own legitimacy, amongst both its domestic population and international audience' (Barr, 2012: 81) . Public diplomacy, in other words, is as much intended for internal consumption as it is directed at foreign publics (Melissen, 2005: 13) . This is also the case in Israel, where the 'Presenting Israel' campaign led to much debate among Israelis about its purpose and the nature of Israeli identity, primarily due to the technique it employed: humour. Indeed, it is impossible to understand the impact of the campaign and how it worked discursively and visually, without taking its use of humour into account.
Humour as a coping mechanism
In the social and human sciences, humour has for many decades been the subject of critical and systematic inquiries. Here, humour is often seen as essential to the construction of identities, and it plays a central role in maintaining and sometimes disrupting a social order.
Humour can serve both to politicise and depoliticise particular social relations (Kuipers, 2005) . Within IR scholarship, however, humour has not received much attention, with a few, but notable exceptions: Wedeen (2002) has provided a superb analysis of the subversive function of humour in Assad's Syria, while other IR scholars have discussed humour in the context of postcolonialism (Krishna, 1993) , conflict resolution (Kuusisto, 2009 ) and pop culture (Payne, 2017 ). Yet humour is still largely seen as an epiphenomenon in world politics, one that is not relevant to issues of war and peace. We wish to argue, however, that humour is a central coping mechanism when it comes to handling international misrecognition.
The most fundamental definition of humour, proposed by Emmanuel Kant is that it arises out of incongruities (Morreall, 2011: 17) . More specifically, its mechanism is an unexpected, often sudden clash, 'which can be between real and unreal (absurd humour), between taboo and non-taboo (e.g. sexual humour, toilet humour, aggressive humour), or between the gruesome and the innocent, the banal, or even the cheerful' (Kuipers, 2005: 456) . As a result, 'there is something odd, abnormal or out of place' in a humorous situation, 'which we enjoy in some way' (Morreall, 2005: 68) . In other words, humour occurs when two ideas or events, that are usually considered incompatible, are juxtaposed, shifting in perspective from seriousness to play (Kuipers, 2008) . Humour, then, plays on the multiple possibilities within an utterance or concept.
Humour has a specific semantic domain of ambiguity that gives its particular political power. Moreover, precisely because of its play with meanings, humour can generate a strong sense of self-identity (as a member of an inclusive, 'us' group) resting on the fact that 'sometimes people just don't get it' (Hutcheon, 1994) . This combination of semantic ambiguity and insider-knowledge is particularly apparent when states object to being ridiculed internationally. For instance, Kazakhstan complained against the mockumentary comedy film, Borat, starring a fictitious Kazakh journalist who travels through the United States, and sought to rehabilitate its international image by publishing advertisements in The New York Times and Foreign Affairs. However, the Kazakh government ended up reinforcing the image of a tragi-comic repressive state (Schatz, 2008: 58) . The Kazakh government was up against the powerful semantics of humour, making it extremely difficult for it to protest against defamation.
In using humour studies to understand how states cope with misrecognition, two theories seem particularly relevant: release and superiority theory. Within the fields of psychology and psychoanalysis, humour is typically understood as a means to release stress/tension and nervous energy (see Zijderveld, 1968 Kuipers, 2008: 375) . In this sense, collectively, humour helps to re-draw the boundaries of a political community. Indeed, studies of national identity have long emphasised the identity-and solidarity-building functions of humour.
However, the play with taboos can also allow for self-critique, i.e. a reversed 
Israel's international misrecognition and its techniques of mediation
The search for international recognition has always been high on the agenda of Israel's foreign policy (Bialer, 2002) . Since the early days of Zionism, Israeli public institutions have been engaged in various international public awareness activities, often referred to as Hasbara (Hebrew for 'explanation' or making reasonable or sensible) on behalf of the state (Toledano and Mckie, 2013) . Despite the desire for recognition, Israel has also, somewhat paradoxically, been characterised by a tendency to 'discount' international opinion and institutions (Adler, 2013) . Historically, its diplomacy has been suspicious of the international community and unilateralist (Peri, 1993) . This, together with the widely shared belief that the world would stay biased against Israel regardless of its actions (Gilboa, 2006) , helps to explain why public diplomacy has largely been neglected in the past. Within recent years, however, this has changed, and as this section shall show, the search for international recognition has become central to Israel's foreign policy focusing on public diplomacy
Israel's national identity
Israel is 'deeply divided along religious, ethnic and political lines' (Waxman 2006, 2) , First, Israel is depicted as a security provider for its citizens, able to deter its enemies.
This identity marker is associated with the traumas of life in diaspora and the Israeli people's sense of victimhood, the existential insecurities of a persistent state of war, and a collective 'siege mentality' (Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992; Barnett, 2013; Peri, 1993; Waltzer, 2013) .
Second, while the majority of the Israeli population is not religious, Jewishness is commonly articulated as being 'fundamental' to Israeli identity, yet understood more in nationalist than religious terms. 5 Third, the idea that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East has become integral to Israeli discourses of Self (Lupovici, 2012; Sucharov, 2005; Waxman, 2006) , often expressed publically through phrases such as 'villa in the jungle'. 6 Needless to say, these narratives of Israeli identity are highly politicised and contested, subject to constant academic and popular debates.
For example, being a security provider and defending the border between the inside and the outside, is an inherent marker of any sovereign state. In Israel, however, the boundaries between outside and the inside were always blurred due to the inclusion of nonIsraeli Jews from around the globe, and the exclusion of the Israeli non-Jews from the parameters of the national Self. Moreover, being a Jewish state often clashes with being democratic one due to the status of the Arab minority and the ongoing policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, leading some some to argue that Israel's democratic identity is in 'recession' (Chazan, 2013; Lupovici, 2012) . Palestinian interests, the BDS movement attempts to delegitimise Israel by branding it as a violent apartheid state. The movement frequently appeals to the international community to put pressure on Israel, with the aim of ending the occupation, dismantling the separation wall, grating the right of return to Palestinian refugees etc. (Ananth, 2013) . These discourses clearly negate the three traditional markers of Israeli identity: The demands to end to 7 Arguably, these tensions make Israel an 'overburdened' polity (Horowitz and Lissak, 1989) (Greenfield, 2012) .
In 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) became responsible for nation branding and a British consulting firm was hired to develop Israel's brand strategy.
According to the MFA's executive director, the strategy was meant to close 'the unbearable gap between our image abroad and who we really are' (Shilo, 2008) by promoting narratives of the Israeli 'special energy', 'entrepreneurial seal' and 'vibrant diversity' (Acanchi, 2008) . MPDDA's survey of 60,000 people in Israel and in the diaspora revealed that over 90 per cent of the respondents agreed with statements such as 'Israel is not perceived correctly in the world' and it is 'important for me to represent Israel abroad and I am willing to take an active part in it' (Attias, 2012: 476) . Backed by these results, the campaign 'Presenting Israel' was launched in 2010, with the aim of 'building Israel's modern public diplomacy ability through its citizens and diasporas' (Attias, 2012: 477) . Unlike the 2008 nation branding initiative, the campaign focused on mobilising 'the communication potential' of Israeli citizens (Attias, 2012: 474) . 
The politics of representation
The videos are clearly parodies mimicking the style of another genre -the travel documentary or the news broadcast -exaggerating these formats to mock the stylistic habits of foreign media such as the BBC or TV5Monde (see Twark, 2007: 21) . The displayed incongruity between Israeli identity markers and the claims in the videos generate humourous clashes through combinations of inconsistent audio-visual elements -the real and the unreal.
As such, the videos play with the widespread notion of misrepresentation by the European ideology' contradicting the two-state solution (Ynet, 2010) . Indeed, the campaign silences Israel's own complex and contradictory identity narratives, especially those of the ArabIsraeli and the secular left, overwriting religious and political divides. Instead, the Israeli citizen-diplomat is constituted in a homogenous and morally superior subject position, where 'the starting point is that we are Ok. Now we just need to explain it' (Mendel, 2010) . Aviv -as gay-friendly. Criticized as 'homonationalism' (Puar, 2013) and 'pinkwashing' (Schulman, 2012) Humour is central to this strategy of fighting international misrecognition.
The role of humour
Two interrelated humour dynamics -the aforementioned release and superiority -are at work in 'Presenting Israel'. First, as related in the second part of the article, humour is often associated with relief from anxieties and fears. This occurs through the release of energies stemming from unconscious repression of issues related to taboos or shame (Wedeen, 1999: 121; Zijderveld, 1968) . In this reading of the videos, the staging of incongruity through over-identification facilitates a release of collective anxieties and fears.
Indeed, the issue of international criticism have been increasingly depicted in Israel in existential terms. A report by the Reut Institute (2010), for example, defined the BDS movement as a 'strategic' and 'existential' threat to Israel. Moreover, influential Israeli scholars and politicians began arguing that Israel's international image, and delegitimisation in particular, are issues of national security which the state is ill equipped to handle due to insufficient attention to public diplomacy (Gilboa, 2006) . The anxious nature of the Israeli responses to its deteriorating international image has been described by some as 'hysteria' (Peled, 2010) . From this perspective, the videos were successful exactly because they brought about a cathartic relief through humour's 'anti-shame' effect, thus helping Israeli society cope with the misrecognition in the mirror of the international Other.
Second, a reading drawing on superiority theory, points to the way in which the videos stage a symbolic victory in relation to the international Other. This is done by degrading the victim of the joke through shaming or ridicule (Kuipers, 2005) . In this light, the rivalry between the MPDDA and the foreign media over the representation of Israel played out in the campaign could be interpreted as an attempt to stage a symbolic victory over the international Other. By ridiculing foreign journalists for being 'stupid' and 'gullible', the campaign establishes 'some eminency in ourselves by comparison with the infirmity of others' (Boskin and Dorinson quoted in Kuipers, 2008: 375) . Offended foreign journalists claimed that the campaign added fuel to the fire, which not only radicalised relations between the Israeli state and the foreign press and, but with Europe as such. In response, Minister Edelstien, discarded these claims by saying that he spoke to many reporters, and that 'those who had a sense of humour were not offended' (Rabinovsky, 2010) .
Precisely in this ambiguity lies the political power of humour: Edelstein is effectively claiming that humour has a license to be offensive. By saying the campaign is 'only joking', Edelstein is using 'the classic let-out clause when for instance a racist joke falls on unreceptive ears ' (Lockyer and Pickering, 2008: 812) . The excuse assumes that a joke is just a joke and cannot be taken seriously. This is exactly the rhetorical effectiveness on which offensive comic discourse relies.
However, the semantics of ambiguity can also be seen through a more speculative reading of the videos. (Tibon, 2015) . Indeed, humour reinstates a certain consensus about the Israeli Self-Other relations and thus depoliticises Israel's domestic and foreign policy. However, without changing the policies for which Israel is being criticised, this strategy seems to strain rather than assist the mediation of Israel's estrangement.
Conclusion
This article made three contributions to IR theory. First, we argued that international misrecognition can be understood as a gap between a dominant narrative of national Self and its image abroad, reflected in the 'mirror' of the International Other. Contrary to most approaches to recognition within IR theory, we proposed that misrecognition is inherent in any identification process. However, misrecognition only becomes politically salient when it is publically articulated as a specific discourse of misrecognition, drawing on a multitude of unarticulated and ambiguous individual experiences. Second, the article argued that one of the prominent ways in which states cope with a discourse of international misrecognition is through public diplomacy. We thus explored public diplomacy as an attempt to stich the gap between dominant national identity markers and the state's global image, creating a fantasy of unity between the national Self and the international Other.
Third, introducing insights from humour theory to IR theory, we explained how humour plays a key, albeit often overlooked role in international relations, contributing both to maintain and to disrupt social order. Following release theory, humour contributes to 'gapstitching' strategies by providing relief for anxieties. Humour's semantic ambiguity can promote self-critique and reflection, creating bonds between states. However, as superiority theorists explain, humour can also establish a sense of superiority and serve as a political weapon to defend a particular version of national Self against criticism from within or outside. Since humour is frequently used to articulate what is seldom stated directly -to manage misrecognition -and deal with taboos, the analysis of humourous practices provides us with important insights into the mechanisms of identification and conflict in international relations.
More specifically, the article explored how the public diplomacy campaign 'Presenting Israel' mobilised citizen diplomats through videos displaying, in a caricature format, how the world sees Israel. By promoting a discourse of international misrecognition, the campaign served to reconstruct and repair a damaged and contested image of the Israeli Self. It did so by exaggerating stereotypes visually and propelling foreign 'myths' about Israel that could easily be contradicted, at least by most Israelis. In the face of international misrecognition, humour thereby performed anxiety release. However, humour also provided a powerful way to circumvent European criticism because any potential serious import of 'Presenting Israel' could be downplayed with the argument that it was 'only joking'. The campaign fought misrecognition by claiming that Israel was a modern, high-tech, peaceful and secular democracy, thereby appealing to sameness and compatibility with European
Others. Yet, at the same time, by mocking Western criticism, the campaign also presented an Israeli Self that appeared to be better than the misinformed European and (possibly) inferior Arab Others. In this sense, rather than explaining Israel, the campaign not only reinforced a particular version of Israeli identity, it also signalled that there is fundamentally no possibility of an international understanding of Israel's situation.
At a more general level, this article argued that the attempt to fight misrecognition and gain acceptance through public diplomacy does not necessarily 'smoothen' national characteristics or elude radical differentiations (Browning, 2013) . Instead, it can be used to shrug off international critics by using humour to cope with anxiety and further radicalise international estrangement. This underlines the point that 'the struggle for recognition may as well lead to an entrenchment of existing differences between Self and Other, thus aggravating their sense of separateness without giving rise to any shared identity in the process (Bartelson, 2013: 120 
